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Prince Haiyang of Later Zhao

后赵海阳王

Shi Hong, ? – 334 · second ruler of the Later Zhao

In the autumn of 333 a young man was led to the throne hall at Xiangguo by the arm. The detail is the record's. Shi Hu, who had commanded its armies since the state was founded, took the heir by the hand and brought him before the officials, and the officials, the record says, scattered. Shi Hong had been crown prince for three years. His father was dead, and the man holding his arm had already sealed the palace, closed the doors of the sickroom, and recalled the princes from their commands. The ceremony went forward. The era name was changed. The reign it announced lasted one year.
The dynasty's own name was Zhao. Historians prefixed Later to separate it from the western Zhao ruled by Liu Yao, and the label Sixteen Kingdoms belongs to a much later age; neither term was used at the courts of the fourth century. Shi Hong was the second ruler of this Zhao, and the first whom it consumed. His father gave him the title of heir and the ceremonial of a successor. His cousin gave him a throne, a year, and a death. He has no record of his own in the Book of Jin, only an appendix to his father's, in a chapter finished in 648 from the histories of the northern courts. Those chapters are records, not annals, and their speeches are compositions. Every scene of Shi Hong was written by the men who replaced him.

1. The Heir Who Read Books

Shi Hong was the second son of Shi Le, or the third by one later notice; the difference cannot be settled. His elder brother Shi Xing, the first heir, died earlier. His mother was Lady Cheng, whose brother Cheng Xia became one of Shi Le's senior secretaries; his legal mother was Lady Liu, the queen.
His education is the most fully recorded thing about him. He studied the classics with Du Gu and the statutes with Xu Xian. Shi Le objected that letters alone would not do in an unpeaceful age, so Liu Zheng and Ren Bo taught him military texts and Wang Yang taught him the sword and spear. The record preserves the teachers and the order of the subjects: classics, law, war. The order is the father's correction, not evidence that the son took to it.
In 319, when Shi Le took the title King of Zhao, he was made heir apparent and given the palace office of commander of the central guard. Later he was made general of the guards, allowed to open a staff, and posted to Ye. The posting was not nominal: Shi Le gave him ten thousand palace troops and the fifty-four battalions of the cavalry general's command, with Wang Yang and the Six Yi to support him. For a few years the heir had an army in a city of his own. Nothing suggests he used it.
In 330 Shi Le took the imperial title and made him crown prince. The portrait is brief: he treated scholars well, wrote verse, and chose his companions from the literati. His courtesy name was Daya, and his father said that Daya was quiet and mild and did not look like a general's son. Xu Guang answered with a precedent. The Han founder took the empire on horseback; Emperor Wen kept it by silence; after a conqueror, a preserver was the course of heaven. Shi Le was pleased. The answer was also a policy: it placed the crown prince at the head of the civil half of the state and left the army to the man who had won it.
Xu Guang did not stop at the compliment. He warned that the Prince of Zhongshan, Shi Hu, was violent and deceitful, and that on the day the emperor died the state would be in danger; the prince's military authority should be reduced by degrees, and the crown prince should be brought into the government. Cheng Xia went further. Shi Hu had held independent command for years, his sons commanded troops, and he looked on everyone but the emperor with contempt. Shi Hu would not serve a boy. Shi Le answered that the realm was not pacified, his heir was young, and a strong assistant was needed; Shi Hu was a founding minister, close as a brother, and would be entrusted with the role of the Duke of Zhou and Huo Guang. Then he accused Cheng Xia of speaking for the empress's family.
Cheng Xia wept and answered that he was thinking of the realm. Shi Le would not hear it. The refusal is usually read as an old man's blindness. It was also a calculation. To remove Shi Hu he would have had to divide the army that had conquered the north, in a country still ringed by enemies. He chose to believe that the army could be lent to a regent and reclaimed. Everything in his son's life follows from that belief.

2. The Two Crowns

The Later Zhao had two sovereign titles. The emperor ruled through the Chinese registers, the law courts and the rites. The Grand Chanyu ruled the Hu settled inside the empire, who had their own courts, judges and commander. Shi Le had held both since 319, when he became King of Zhao. The Chanyu's office was not ceremonial: it carried command of the Guoren, the armed people of the state.
Shi Hu had been the Chanyu's chief assistant since 319, and commander of the palace guards. For eleven years he ran the Hu half of the government in fact, while the title belonged to his uncle. In 330 Shi Le rearranged the two crowns. The Chanyu's title went to his own son, then a boy, who was also made commander-in-chief of all armies and Prince of Qin. Shi Hu was made grand commandant and acting head of the secretariat, with the title Prince of Zhongshan. It was a high civil office and a great fief, and it was a demotion. The office he had exercised for eleven years was given to a child, and the child received the military dignity that went with it. Shi Hu kept the armies in the field; he lost the name that made them his.
The namesake requires a note. Shi Le had two sons whose names are homophones and identical in transliteration: Shi Hong the crown prince, and Shi Hong, Prince of Qin, the boy who received the Chanyu's title. They were different men, and the second was killed with the first. The record distinguishes them by title, not by name.
Why did Shi Le not pass the throne to Shi Hu? The question assumes the throne was his to give, and the assumption is half the answer. A dynasty that had taken the imperial title could not transmit it to a nephew and remain a dynasty. It would become a confederacy with Chinese ceremonial, and the title would lose the meaning that made Chinese officials serve it. Cheng Xia named the essential fact: Shi Hu had been raised in the palace, but he was not the emperor's son. The crown prince was the guarantee that the state was a state and not a war band that had taken a city.
There was a second reason, and it was military. Shi Hu's power was personal. He had recruited, fed and led the Guoren cavalry for more than a decade, and his sons commanded its units. A purge would not have removed one man; it would have split the army into two followings. Shi Le would not break that army while the Jin in the south and the Murong in the northeast still stood. So he tried to separate the title from the following: the Chanyu's name to a son, the civil seals to the nephew, and the deathbed decree to hold them together.
The decree is preserved, and it is a document of the failure. Shi Le ordered a plain burial, forbade the provincial commanders to leave their posts for the funeral, and told his sons to hold together, with the house of Sima as their warning. Then he wrote the sentence that undid the rest: the crown prince was young and might not bear the burden he was leaving him. To Shi Hu he addressed a public instruction to behave as the Duke of Zhou and Huo Guang had behaved, and to leave later generations no pretext for reproach. The instruction named the regent's duty before the whole court. It also named the doubt. A man told publicly that the heir may fail has been given a licence to judge him.
The record adds a scene from the sickroom. Shi Hu controlled the doors, forged orders, kept the crown prince and senior officials out, and recalled two princes without authority. Shi Le noticed one and asked why he had come; the answer was a lie, that the prince was already on the road back. The man who had made a state could not keep order in his own sickroom. By the time he died the succession had been decided in the corridor.

3. The Autumn of 333

Shi Le died. Shi Hu brought the crown prince to the throne hall, arrested Cheng Xia and Xu Guang, handed them to the commandant of justice, and had them killed. Shi Hu's son Shi Sui entered the palace with troops. The officials scattered. Shi Hong offered the throne. Shi Hu refused with the correct formula: when a ruler dies and the heir is established, how dare a minister disorder the succession? Shi Hong wept and insisted. Shi Hu grew angry: if the heir was unequal to the office, the realm would have its own judgment, and there was nothing to discuss. Then he forced him to take the throne.
The refusal is not modesty, and the anger is not impatience. Shi Hu wanted a deposition, not an abdication. To accept the throne from Shi Hong's hands would have made him Shi Hong's successor and conceded that Shi Hong had been legitimate. A deposition begins with a verdict: unfit, without mourning rite, unequal to the burden. The formula about the realm's judgment is the language of that verdict. The two refusals, one at the accession and one a year later, are the same scene played twice, and both times Shi Hu speaks the line that keeps the initiative.
The accession was paid for in titles. Shi Hu became chancellor, Prince of Wei, Grand Chanyu, with the nine bestowals, the revenues of thirteen commanderies and the supervision of all government. Shi Hu made his own son crown prince of Wei. Shi Le's old ministers were given the empty chairs of left and right chancellor; Shi Hu's staff took the secretariat and the palace guard. The crown prince's palace was renamed the Palace of Reverent Instruction and handed to the late emperor's widow and her women. The jewels and horses went to Shi Hu's residence.
Not everyone in the palace accepted the settlement. Lady Liu, Shi Le's queen and Shi Hong's legal mother, plotted with Shi Kan, the founder's adopted son and Prince of Pengcheng. Shi Kan proposed to ride for Yanzhou, hold a city, raise the provincial commanders in the empress dowager's name, and proclaim Shi Hui, Prince of Nanyang, as leader. The plan failed. Shi Kan was caught and killed, Lady Liu was killed, and Shi Hong's birth mother, Lady Cheng, was made empress dowager. The last defence of the succession came from the late emperor's widow and an adopted prince, not from the officials who had warned the founder.
The following year was civil war. Shi Sheng in the Guanzhong and Shi Lang at Luoyang rose against Shi Hu. Shi Hu took Luoyang with seventy thousand men and killed Shi Lang. In the west his army was broken at the Tong Pass; a Xianbei contingent changed sides, Shi Sheng was killed by his own officers, and the Guanzhong was taken. More than a hundred thousand households of Yong and Qin were moved east of the passes. A second campaign reduced the last holdout and deported thirty thousand more.
None of this was Shi Hong's war. No independent order survives. The only acts of policy the record attributes to him are coerced: the appointment of Shi Hu, and the command to build the Wei terrace in the manner of the ancient minister who had governed in a child's name. A reign that consists of other men's campaigns and two extorted documents is not a reign. It is an interregnum with an emperor in it.

4. The Seal and the Carriage

In the eleventh month of 334 Shi Hong took the imperial seal and ribbons to the Wei palace and told Shi Hu he wished to yield the throne. Shi Hu answered that the realm would have its own judgment, and asked why the emperor raised the matter himself. Shi Hong went back and wept before his mother. The sentence the record gives him is short: the former emperor truly has no descendants left.
Then the forms were played out. The Wei administration asked for the precedent of Yao and Shun, the sage kings who yielded to a worthier man. Shi Hu rejected it with contempt. Shi Hong, he said, was benighted, had behaved without rite during mourning, and could not rule the ten thousand states; he should simply be deposed. There was to be no abdication, because an abdication would be a transaction between two legitimate rulers. There was to be a deposition, because a deposition is a judgment passed by the man who holds the army.
Guo Yin entered with the imperial tally and declared Shi Hong Prince of Haiyang. The record gives the deposed emperor one last scene. He walked to the carriage without haste, his face unchanged, and told the officials that he had not been fit to inherit the great succession, that he was ashamed before them, that the mandate had gone, and that there was nothing to say. The officials wept and the palace women wailed. The scene is the conventional ending of a reign, and the one scene in which the record lets him speak at length, in the voice the historians thought proper to a scholar in a catastrophe.
He was taken with his mother, Lady Cheng, and his two brothers, the Prince of Qin and the Prince of Nanyang, to the Palace of Reverent Instruction. They were killed soon afterwards. The record counts his reign as two years, the inclusive count of 333 and 334; by the calendar he held the title for about fifteen months. He was given no posthumous name. The title at the head of this article is the one he bore at the end, conferred by the man who killed him.
Shi Hu took the style of regent and Heavenly King of Zhao, and in the following year changed the era name and moved the court to Ye. The reign that followed is another history. What ended here was not only a life. It was the arrangement by which a Hu army and a Chinese chancery were to be held together by a single house. The army had taken the chancery's throne, and it did not give it back.

5. The Appendix

The Book of Jin gives Shi Hong no chapter. His notice is a few hundred characters appended to his father's record, and the next chapters belong to Shi Hu. The form is not an accident of editing. It is a judgment about what counts as a reign. A ruler who issues no independent orders, appoints no officials of his own and does not survive his second year is not given a place in the sequence; he is attached to the man whose authority he borrowed.
The thinness has three causes. The first is duration. He held the title for a little over a year and changed the era name once, to Yanxi in 334. There was no time for a policy, and no policy was attempted. The second is the archive. The Later Zhao had commissioned its own histories in 319: a record of the founding in Shangdang, a daily register of the general-in-chief, and a separate record of the Grand Chanyu. After 333 the clerks who kept them served Shi Hu. A regent who had just deposed an emperor had no interest in preserving the daily acts of the man he had judged unfit.
The third cause is the form in which the history reached the Tang. A Tang commission finished the Book of Jin in 648, using the state histories of the northern courts and Cui Hong's Spring and Autumn of the Sixteen States, a compilation of the sixth century. Its chapters on the sixteen states are records, not annals, and keep the shape of the court diaries they used. The compilation known today as the Spring and Autumn was assembled in the Ming from the Book of Jin, the Book of Wei and the Comprehensive Mirror, and is not an independent witness. The Comprehensive Mirror itself, completed in 1084, is a secondary work. What remains is a set of scenes from one archive, all serving one narrative: the heir who wept and yielded, the regent who refused and then judged, the officials who wept as the carriage left.
The scenes are not therefore false. They are shaped. The tears at the accession, the two refusals, the composed walk to the carriage: these are the gestures a court history assigns to the last ruler of a failed succession, and their polish is evidence of the political need that produced them. A record that wanted his own words would have preserved an order, a memorial, a judgment. It preserved a leaving.
What can be recovered is smaller and more exact. A boy was educated in the classics, the statutes and the art of war, in that order, by his father's command. He was given an army at Ye and the record never shows him using it. He was made crown prince in 330 and emperor in 333, and in neither office did he control the government. He tried twice to give away the throne and was refused both times, because the man who wanted it needed him deposed rather than succeeded. He was killed with his mother and brothers in a palace that had been his own household. The record is short, and its shortness is the most accurate thing about it: a reign that consisted of being used does not leave much to write.