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Liu He of Han Zhao
汉赵刘和
Liu He, ? – 310 · eldest son of Liu Yuan and seventh-day ruler of Han Zhao
At the Ximing Gate of the palace at Pingyang the guard changed with the day, and on an ordinary morning the change was only a matter of men taking posts along the wall. One file came off the gate and another went on. Nothing in the rotation was decided by the man inside the throne room, and nothing in it needed his consent. The men at the gate stood there because another man had put them there. That was the whole of it, and it was also the succession. Whoever held the door decided who could cross it to reach the throne and who was turned back into the city; the man with the better claim was only one of the people the door could refuse. In the seventh month of 310 the new emperor did not command the men at his own gate.
Liu He had the better claim of the two men who mattered that month. By birth he stood first among Liu Yuan's sons; in 308, when his father assumed the imperial title, he was created Prince of Liang and grand marshal, the most exalted military designation the state could confer. When Liu Yuan died at Pingyang in the seventh month of 310 the throne came to the eldest son by the ordinary expectation of the house. What did not come with it was the army. The command, the tribal title and the office built for the tribes had been given elsewhere, on the deathbed and by the same hand that made him heir. The men on the wall at Ximing belonged to that other settlement. This is the hinge of the week that followed: the legitimate heir was also the disarmed one, and the disarming was the work of the father from whom he inherited his legitimacy.
1. A Throne and an Army
Liu He's mother was of the Huyan, the old nobility of the southern Xiongnu that for generations had supplied wives and fighting men to the chanyus and now supplied them to the house of Liu. The connection gave the eldest son a lineage inside the tribal world as well as the Chinese one. What the record preserves of the man himself is slight and unkind. It dwells on a tall frame and a handsome face, on his schooling in the Odes, on his reading of the Zuo Tradition, and finally on the line that decides the reign: he was a man who suspected those about him and never learned to attach them to himself. That verdict was composed at the court of the brother who had him killed, and it reads less like a portrait than like the explanation the victors owed themselves. It is better treated as a verdict on the outcome than as evidence about a character. The one act the sources put in his hands fits it, but the act is the coup, and the coup is what the verdict explains.
The settlement of the seventh month of 310 was made while Liu Yuan was still alive or, in the record's phrasing, at his last instructions. Three clan elders were charged with the government: Liu Huanle as grand steward, Liu Yang as grand tutor, Liu Yannian as grand guardian. These were civil offices, and the men who held them were the men the new emperor would have at his side. They were also men without troops of their own. The army went to the fourth son, Liu Cong, who received the grand marshalcy, the title of Grand Chanyu, and the post of director of the secretariat. A new office was made for him west of the city, the Chanyu Office, with Liu Yao, a nephew of Liu Yuan, and Qiao Zhiming as its two auxiliaries over the Six Yi. The throne and the civil seals went to the heir; the army, the tribes and the new office went to his brother.
The other sons were not disarmed. Among them was Liu Yu, Prince of Qi, a son of Liu Yuan; he held troops in the capital region and is not to be confused with the Liu Yu who founded the Liu-Song house a century later. Liu Long of Lu, another son, held troops near it. The youngest, Liu Yi, whose mother was Shan, a Di chief's daughter, had a command as well. All of them had been given their soldiers by the same father who had just named the heir. The settlement was therefore not a regency in the ordinary sense but a balance: a throne at the centre and armed brothers around it, each with a following that answered to him and not to the palace. A balance of title against force is another name for a coup waiting on a pretext. The pretext, when it came, was supplied by men who had been left out of the balance altogether.
2. Four Columns
The two men who urged the purge had no place in the regency. One was Huyan You, the new emperor's maternal uncle, his mother's brother and the representative of the clan whose ships and marriages had carried the Liu this far. The other was Liu Rui, Prince of Xichang. The two men put their warning as a chain of reasoning: princes were entrenched inside the capital with strong followings at their back; the Grand Chanyu had assembled a great army and quartered it in the suburbs; and any throne that could be cut off from the rest of the city was a throne in name only. The figure attached to that army in the later chronicle is a hundred thousand, and it must be read as a round number of fear, the size a man imagines when he believes he is surrounded, not a count of men who were actually there. The argument itself is the court's composition, put in the mouths of advisers so that the reader is told what the danger was. Its usefulness is that it tells us what the new emperor's party believed, which was that the brothers would move first.
One voice in the council went the other way. The record has Liu Sheng, Prince of Anchang, answer that the late emperor was still in his coffin, that no prince had stirred, and that a family war at the moment of burial would bring the new reign into contempt. He was killed for saying it. This is the most valuable sentence in the seven days, because it is the one detail that tells against the men who made the plot. A court writing the history of a victorious self-defence had no reason to invent a victim who warned that there was no threat; it kept the detail because it could not be removed, and it kept it at the cost of its own case. The objection also fixes the character of the operation. It was preventive. It rested on a prediction, not on an act, and the only evidence offered was that armed brothers existed and might be used.
The purge was assigned in four separate strikes, one for each brother. Liu Rui drew the task of moving against Liu Cong; Huyan You, that of seizing Liu Yu of Qi; Liu Cheng and Liu Qin, two officers, were detailed for Liu Long of Lu; and Liu Yi, the youngest, was left to Tian Mi, who commanded the palace guard. The plan was to remove four princes in a single night and to do it before any of them could join the others. It failed in the way such plans fail when the force is spread thin. Tian Mi took his men across to Liu Cong and warned him of the plot. Liu Cong had his soldiers put on armour and kept them waiting behind the walls of his camp in the western part of the city. Liu Rui attacked him and was driven back. The columns sent against the other brothers succeeded: Liu Yu and Liu Long were killed. Then Liu Cong moved.
The gate was lost before the purge orders could reach the men they named, and the throne followed the gate. The two men who had designed the purge were seized and executed, and their heads were shown in the streets. From the first order to the death, the whole thing occupied seven days. The reign had no other event.
3. The Second Throne
The order to kill had been issued by the man who held the throne, and the men who could carry it out belonged to the men named in it. That is the arithmetic underneath the week. Legitimacy was all on one side; the means of enforcing it were all on the other. The heir could command an arrest and could not find a soldier to make it. The brother who was to be arrested had the army, the tribal following and the chain of command that ran west of the city. When the order was given, the two sides of the settlement separated, and the side with the throne was the side that could not defend it.
The plan made the separation worse by dividing its own strength. Four columns were sent after four brothers, so that the column facing Liu Cong, the one target that mattered, was no larger than the columns sent after the others. A single strong column at the gate might have held the western camp in; four moderate ones could not. And the one column placed where it could have blocked the counterattack was the one that changed sides on the way. Tian Mi's defection decided the week more than any battle. Liu Cong had only to survive the first approach and keep the gate, and the throne came to him with the palace.
The office at the centre of this was newer than the succession itself. The Chanyu Office had been created on the deathbed and given to Liu Cong with two assistants and a command over the Six Yi that did not pass through the civil government. The deathbed set two chains of command under one crown; in 310 the result was exact — the heir held the crown and could issue orders, the brother held the tribal chain and had the men to enforce them.
Around the throne were the princely camps. Each prince kept two thousand soldiers in the capital, a figure that reads as a standard establishment rather than a tally, but the size is the point. Two thousand is too small a force to hold a province and just large enough to command a doorway — which is why that particular number recurs. It is the size that turns a seizure into a feasible undertaking and leaves the victim no time to organise a defence, and every son of the house was given a detachment of exactly that strength. The field armies that had taken cities elsewhere were far off; the men who decided the succession were household soldiers and the guard at the door.
The third tie was marriage. The Liu had married the Huyan, whose old position among the southern tribes made the match a treaty with an armed house; they had married the Shan, a Di chief's family, for the same reason. Every such marriage gave the wife's clan a stake in the palace and a reason to care who sat in it. In 310 the treaty with the Huyan returned the emperor's own uncle as the chief engineer of the coup against him. A ruler who governs through his household should not be surprised when his household acts on its own account. Court, harem, secretariat, guard and the princes' camps all stood within one wall; a remonstrance of the period speaks of more than forty halls, a round figure for a palace whose political world was small enough to be seized in a week. Whoever commanded the guard on that wall commanded the state, and command of the state could lapse before the next relief came round.
4. The Winners' Account
In the Book of Jin, the history a Tang commission completed in 648, the Han Zhao are covered in three chapters of records: the first on Liu Yuan, the second on Liu Cong, the third on Liu Yao. Liu He's seven days are closed out at the end of the chapter belonging to his father, and no record is set aside for him.
That placement is a judgment about what counts as a reign, but the more consequential judgment was made earlier, at the court where the seven days were written down. The account was composed under Liu Cong, whose interest lay in showing a plot formed against him and a response confined to self-defence when he took the gate and reached the hall. The narrative is a defence arranged as a chronicle. Its facts are not therefore invented, but they are selected to produce a verdict, and the verdict is that the dead man brought his death on himself.
The portrait of Liu He belongs to the same arrangement. A suspicious heir who could not bind men to him is what a victorious court needed to say about a ruler it had removed, because it accounts for the removal without ever examining the settlement that made it. The settlement is the part that is left out: the army had been taken from him before he did anything. The order to kill four princes is then offered as proof of the character, when it is more naturally read as the consequence of the disposition. The circle is the mark of the hand that wrote it.
One detail escapes the arrangement. The remonstrance of Liu Sheng, warning that there was no threat and that a family war would disgrace a fresh reign, damages the men who made the plot. A court defending a preventive coup had no reason to invent a man who said there was nothing to prevent. To carry off a self-defence that never occurred the court had to manufacture a threat; that it kept Liu Sheng's objection at all is the single crack in its own case, and it fixes the nature of the operation for us: the brothers were to be killed on a prediction, not in response to a move. The dialogues in the account are compositions in the idiom of the classics, with precedents quoted in the proper places. What they preserve is the court's notion of how a coup should be talked about, rather than any actual utterance. The figures bear the same mark. A hundred thousand troops outside the walls and over forty halls within the palace are rounded sums — the one gauging panic, the other the compass of a world that could be seized in seven days.
What cannot be recovered should be left alone. No birth year is recorded, and no age is offered here. What the order was meant to achieve cannot now be known; the sole utterances credited to the heir were composed by the court that succeeded him. What remains is the outline of a week and the fact of its ending, enough for the structure of the thing and not for a motive.
5. Seven Days in Herui
A week allows no policy, and none was attempted. The only acts the record can attach to the throne are the order against the four princes and the counterattack that answered it; everything else in the palace that week was done by other men. No official he named kept his post, no order he gave survived the change of guard, no messenger was received at his court, and no favour he bestowed lasted beyond the next changing of the watch. A ruler with no dependants holds nothing but a title and a bodyguard — and even that bodyguard answered to someone else.
He had not changed the era, and there had not been time. The era over those seven days was his father's last, Herui, and it remained there because a week does not bring a calendar to the point where it can be reset. Nothing else of his survives to be counted. He had taken the throne as the eldest son with the regents his father left him, and in seven days he had lost the gate, the palace and the argument. The single number the record leaves is the measure of the reign itself. Seven. Seven days under his father's era, and the era was never his to change.