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Emperor Yin of Han Zhao

汉赵隐帝

Liu Can, ? – 318 · fourth ruler of Han Zhao, deposed and killed by his father-in-law

Under a robe there is a space. A man can layer cloth into that space, pad it, stitch it, and call the result armour; no one sees it until the robe is lifted. In the fourth month of 317 such a layer stood at the centre of a case. A warning reached the Eastern Palace that an order had gone out for its men to wear armour beneath their robes, and the young men of the household, believing the warning, put the cloth on. The order had been forged. But the cloth was real, and once it was on, the wearers were men in armour, and men in armour under a prince's roof were men in a conspiracy. That was all the case required: a garment that could be called armour, and someone to say it was there.
A son of Liu Cong, Liu Can was the fourth man to hold the throne of the Han line. He had learned the craft of the palace coup from his father, who won the throne in 310 by reaching the gate ahead of the heir, and in 317 he turned that craft on the youngest son of the founder. A month after he became emperor the same craft was turned on him, by the man who had stood beside him while he learned it, and on that occasion no member of the family survived. Twice within a single wall the throne changed hands, and on neither occasion did an army from the frontier decide the result. What follows is the record of how the second of those transfers was managed, and of what was left afterwards.

1. Son of the Coup

In 310, while Liu Cong was preparing to fight for the throne, his son Liu Can was made Prince of Henei, given the title Grand General Who Comforts the Army, and placed in command of the troops in the capital and the provinces. These were not honorifics. They put the soldiers of Pingyang in the hands of the fourth son's branch of the family, and when the founder died in 310 and the succession broke into violence, Liu Can was on the winning side. What he was doing through the seven days of his uncle's reign goes unstated in the source. It is enough that he held the capital's command when his father took the throne, and that the lesson he drew from that week was not about loyalty.
The lesson was about sequence. In 310 the eldest son had held the title of heir and the civil regents, while the fourth son held the army. He had watched his father win in 310 because the side with soldiers, not the side with the title, reached the gate first, and what he took from it was that a succession in this state was settled by whoever controlled the palace at the moment the old ruler died. The name of heir was worth only the guards who would stand behind it. He would never, in his own reign, rely on a name alone.
The years between 310 and 318 pass quickly in the sources. He served in the west with Liu Yao, the clan nephew who commanded the armies beyond the passes, and later held the chancellorship and the title Prince of Jin, with the revenues of five commanderies. These offices matter less for what they say about his abilities than for what they show about his position: he was a prince who had been near the machinery of government since youth, familiar with the secretariat and the household troops, and never a commander of the field armies that had taken the two Jin capitals. When he came to act, he acted as a palace politician, not as a general.
At Pingyang the court, the harem, the secretariat, the guard and the princes' households were all contained within one wall, and the paperwork of government was in the hands of eunuchs who served the emperor and no one else. There was no class of officials whose continuity could outlive a ruler. What held the state together was the family and its marriages, and what could take it apart was a few hundred armed men at the right door. Liu Can had grown up inside that arrangement and had no reason to think it would fail him. He had seen it work once, for his father. What he did not consider was that the same arrangement would work just as well for a man who was not a Liu.
So when his father died he was prepared. He knew the office he wanted, he knew the men who could deliver it, and he knew which signature made an order real. He had learned all three in 310 and again in 317. What he had not learned was that a craft can be used from either side of a throne, and that the man who teaches it is not obliged to remain a pupil.

2. The Case of Liu Yi

Of all Liu Yuan's sons Liu Yi was the youngest, and Liu Cong had at one point singled him out as the one to succeed him. He had the affection of the soldiers and the goodwill of the Di and Qiang chiefs who supplied the tribal levies, which made him the one prince whose support could not be assumed. In the fourth month of 317 a warning reached his household: a secret order had gone out, and the men of the Eastern Palace were to wear armour beneath their robes. Liu Yi believed the warning, or at least acted as if he did, and passed it on. His men put on the padded cloth.
Liu Can then told his father that the prince's men were in armour. Jin Zhun, whose family was already married into the imperial house, and the eunuch Wang Chen seized a number of Di and Qiang chiefs and tortured them until they named a conspiracy. The emperor signed the order that followed. Everyone on the Eastern Palace staff was put to death; fifteen thousand soldiers — a figure the source rounds for the scale of the punishment, not a muster actually counted — were buried alive; and Liu Yi was first stripped of rank and then executed. In the seventh month of that year Liu Can was made crown prince, and he kept his chancellorship.
The operation has a shape worth setting out, because the rest of the reign repeats it. It called for no field army. The ingredients were a warning invented in advance, cloth that could pass as armour, someone to carry the story upward, a confession beaten out of men who had done nothing, and the emperor's own hand at the bottom. Remove any one of the five and the case would have been an accusation rather than a sentence. With all five in place, a prince who had been promised the throne became a traitor who had been lawfully removed. Liu Can had not watched this happen to someone else. He had assembled the five parts himself.
And Jin Zhun had assembled them with him. He was the man who produced the tortured confession and the man who carried out the killing of Liu Yi. The lesson Liu Can took from the case was not that his uncle had been dangerous; it was that the throne could be cleared by a process, and that the process could be managed from inside a palace by men who knew where the seals and the guards were. A month later the same process would be managed against him, and the man who had taught it to him would be standing at the head of the soldiers.
The record adds that the Di and Qiang rose after the case, which is what one would expect when their chiefs have been tortured into testimony and their prince killed. The rising was put down. What it left behind was a court in which the tribal soldiers had learned that a word from the palace could reach them with a torturer attached. Liu Can kept the chancellorship and the title of crown prince, and appeared to have secured the succession. He had in fact done something narrower: he had shown how the succession could be taken.

3. Hanchang

Liu Cong died in the seventh month of 318, and the crown passed to Liu Can on the following day. He changed the era to Hanchang. It was his own era, not Linjia, which had been his father's last, and the change was meant to declare that a new reign had opened. For a few weeks it seemed to have. He made the appointments a new ruler was expected to make and let it be understood that the operation of 317 had settled the succession for good.
Four of his father's widows were raised to the rank of dowager empress; among them was the younger daughter of Jin Zhun, formerly Liu Cong's Right Empress. His own empress he raised from a third daughter of that same house, and the heir he designated was his son Liu Yuangong. The record says that blood fell on Pingyang and that he brought his father's women into his own household; those are the details a hostile account supplies, and they are set down here as the record's rather than as facts known independently. The part that can be relied on is the family arithmetic. Jin Zhun had placed two daughters in the father's palace and a third in the son's.
By the eighth month the man who had helped Liu Can destroy his uncle was the father of one of the four dowager empresses, the father of the empress, and the grandfather of the heir. The palace and the government were one and the same, and that government now lay in the hands of his wife's father. This was not a hidden fact. It was the public structure of the court, and Liu Can appears to have regarded it as a strength, the marriage that tied a powerful house to his own. He had learned in 310 that the winner was the man at the gate. It did not occur to him that he had married the gate.
His first weeks were spent on the surface of power: titles, audiences, the formal acts of a ruler who had inherited a working state. There was no field campaign to distract him, and the one man who might have mattered, Liu Yao in the west, was beyond the passes. Everything that could decide the throne was inside one palace, and the palace was full of his wife's relations. He had every reason to believe that the craft he had learned in 317 had made him safe.
What he did not see was that the craft he had learned did not belong to him. It was a set of moves available to anyone who held the seals and the doors, and he had placed both in the hands of his father-in-law. The reign had a name, Hanchang, and the name was new; the machinery underneath it was the same machinery that had moved the throne in 317, and it was already in other hands.

4. The Two-Stage Charge

Within weeks the father-in-law replayed his 317 method: the emperor first, then, when he stalled, the daughters who were his own lever. The record has Jin Zhun warn him that the princes were preparing the course of Yi Yin and Huo Guang, the two regents of antiquity who set a king aside for the good of the realm. Their object now, he said, was to depose the young ruler, to kill Jin Zhun himself, and to put Liu Ji, a prince of the clan, on the throne. Liu Can did not act on the warning. In the language of the record, he hesitated — which is the word a court history uses when it wants a ruler seen as slow rather than unwilling.
Jin Zhun carried the same charge to his daughters in the palace, and their telling of it — that the princes meant to destroy their house — was the version Liu Can accepted. The order he signed was the same kind of order he had signed in 317, only the name at the bottom was his own. The four senior men of the clan who stood nearest the throne — Liu Jing, Liu Ji, Liu Mai and lastly Liu Cheng — were put to death on his order. Huyan Yan, a commander of long standing, was named in the same alleged plot. The record does not allow us to say what the four men had actually done. It records only that they were killed.
Two civil officials, Zhu Ji and Fan Long, the most experienced men at Pingyang, fled west to Chang'an and the protection of Liu Yao. They took their knowledge of the court with them and left behind a government with no one who remembered how it had been run. Wang Yan, an aged grandee who would not join the new arrangement and tried to carry a warning to the throne, was seized on his way. The posts of grand general and head of the secretariat went to Jin Zhun, and documents appointing his relatives were issued under the emperor's seal. Within a month the offices that governed the state had passed to the family of the emperor's wife.
The two-stage charge is the whole art of it. He accused the princes to the emperor first, and when the emperor would not move he accused them to the emperor's wives, who were his own daughters. It did not matter that the accusation was false, or that the accusers stood to gain by it. What mattered was that the order to kill came signed by the hand the plot required. Liu Can had used exactly such an order in 317, signed by his father. Now he signed one himself, against men of his own clan, and the signature was the only part of the operation that was genuinely his.
Everything else had been supplied by his father-in-law: the accusation, the urgency, the women who repeated it, and the men who would carry it out. Liu Can's contribution was the seal. It is worth remembering how recently he had been on the other side of just such a transaction. In 317 the father's signature had made a forged case into a lawful sentence; in 318 the son's signature did the same service for a forged case against the son's own relatives. The craft had not changed hands. It had merely changed which Liu was holding it.

5. The Guangji Hall

With the seniors dead, Liu Can mustered his soldiers beyond the walls and gave out that a campaign would be fought against Shi Le, commander of the eastern plain. Shi Le appears no further in these pages; the name serves only to place the eastern army. The review was a performance of command: troops counted, an enemy named, a march promised. It was empty, because the soldiers who could decide the throne were not the field army but the men at the palace gate, and those men had another master. The campaign was never fought. The only march that followed was Jin Zhun's, the short distance from his residence to the hall.
Then the emperor withdrew to the rear palace and drank, and according to the source it was Jin Zhun who decided every matter. The man who held the title of emperor kept the title and gave up the room in which it was exercised. Jin Zhun did not need an army from outside. The hall, the recited crimes and the name that would outlast him were all his father-in-law to give; the previous month had put that house in charge of the palace. The speeches at the hall are the national history's composition in the idiom of the classics; they tell us what a deposition was supposed to sound like, not what anyone said. Hanchang had been in use for little more than a month.
The odd thing about the end is how little resistance it met. Liu Can had been a prince with troops, a chancellor, and an heir before he was an emperor; he knew how a palace was held. But every appointment of the previous month had gone to the house that was now arresting him, and the men who could have answered an order in his name were the men taking it. A ruler who has signed away the men around him does not need to be overwhelmed. He only needs to be informed.
Nothing in the record suggests a flight, a summons to the provinces, or an appeal to the princes' camps. The capital had been the whole political world, and by the eighth month of 318 even that world had contracted to a hall and a handful of soldiers at its door. The empire outside — the commands in the west, the armies on the eastern plain — learned of the change when it was over, because the throne had always been settled inside the walls before anyone beyond them could march.
Jin Zhun then assumed the rank of grand general along with the style of Heavenly King of Han, and dispatched envoys to the Jin court with an offer of submission. The dynasty had been founded on a promise to restore the Han; it had captured both Jin capitals and held two Jin emperors prisoner, and now its regent was petitioning that same court for a title of his own. His own kinsmen killed him before the year was out. Liu Yao arrived from Chang'an in the winter and gathered what was left; in 319 the state was renamed Zhao. That succession belongs to his life, not this one.

6. What the Fire Took

The material for Liu Can is thin, and the reason is not only that he reigned for a month. The men who could have carried the court's papers out of Pingyang were killed or scattered, and the institutions that held them were dismantled. Zhu Ji and Fan Long, the civil officials with the longest memories, fled west and became Liu Yao's servants, taking what they knew into another court. The palace records survived neither their authors nor the building that held them, for the whole establishment was dismantled within that month.
What followed was a silence with no second copy. There was no rival archive to set against the one account, because the men who might have kept one had been killed in the market or had carried their papers to Chang'an, and the building that held the rest had burned.
In the three chapters of records the Book of Jin gives the Han Zhao, the single month of Liu Can is tucked onto the end of his father Liu Cong's chapter, just as the seven days of Liu He are tucked onto the end of Liu Yuan's — an arrangement that makes the two short reigns answer each other without the compilers ever arguing it.
The Tang commission finished the Book of Jin in 648 and chose what mattered to an empire it had just reunified. What mattered was the fall of the two Jin capitals and the capture of two emperors, not a hall at Pingyang. One source was the collection Cui Hong had made in the sixth century, a book already gone before the Northern Song ended. What passes for that work now is a Ming-era assembly, put together by Tu Qiaosun and Xiang Linzhi from passages of the Book of Jin, the Book of Wei and the Comprehensive Mirror. It is not an independent witness, and where it appears fuller it is fuller by sewing together other books. What could be burned was burned; what survived was remade.
No age is recorded for Liu Can, and none is given here. The fifteen thousand, the single month, the list of crimes recited at the hall — these are the record's round figures and formal scenes, not measurements of what happened. The intentions of the men in this last month are unknown, because the only words preserved to them were composed by the court that replaced them. What cannot be recovered should be left named only as far as the sources carry it.
What was left of him was a single word, and his killer chose it. Jin Zhun gave the dead emperor the posthumous name Yin — the hidden, the unlit — and this single word was all of Liu Can's that his killers let remain. Then the clan was taken to the Eastern Market and cut down, men and women without regard to age. The burial places of Liu Yuan and Liu Cong were broken into, and the ancestral temple was put to the torch. The name Yin outlasted the temple; it was all that remained of a ruler whose family, palace and records had been taken apart inside a month.